One of the major aspects of transition was the entrance of foreign goods and services either through trade or direct investments. Foreign direct investments (FDI) became the most important source of capital for the transition economies in Europe mainly due to their difficulty to access external loans and as a result of insufficient development of their financial markets before 1990. The ten new European Union member states ) （EU-10) expected to attract high foreign investments immediately after the collapse of the socialist economy, but at the same time investors viewed with scepticism the health of their economic environment. Some countries managed to attract higher inflows than others ; at present the EU -10 economies are competing to attract more FDI since they have outgrown the privatisation-led type. In order to attract higher inflows they need to either offer new attractive determinants or develop existing ones.
FDI in the EU-10, corporate governance and Japanese investments. The theoretical consideration provides the definitions and theory applied in this paper. The focus is on the Japanese investments and the type of investments in the EU-10. The empirical analysis details the correlation between corporate governance and Japanese FDI to the EU -10. The conclusion emphasises the fact that the EU-10 economies in the future need to perfect their macro corporate governance in order to continue to attract foreign investments, and specifically Japanese investments.
．Literature review
The topic of FDI in transition economies has received massive attention since it is an important source of attracting capital. The Central European countries are better studied that the South East ones or the Baltic States due to being receivers of higher FDI based on the fact that they are considered ʻfast reformersʼ. The large majority of studies on the EU-10 either analyze countries separately or are aggregate area studies. To the authorʼs knowledge, there is no study examining Japanese FDI flows to the EU-10 correlating investments to corporate governance.
The literature on FDI in EU -10 can be divided into three main categories : studies that focus on the theory of FDI, studies that focus on the impact of FDI on economic growth and studies that explain the determinants of FDI.
The first category of research is represented by Meyer and Peng ）examines whether horizontal or vertical FDI is predominant in the region and reports that in Central European economies horizontal FDI is prevalent but that the evidence for South East European countries is inconclusive.
Among the determinants of FDI recently corporate governance variables have been added to analyses. Corporate governance is supposed to boost the development process in less developed countries in two ways :
by raising the degree of transparency of internal financial markets and by increasing the countryʼs political credibility abroad making it attractive to FDI. Case studies (Oman, 2001 ઋ) ）suggest that an appropriate system of corporate governance helps increase the flow of financial capital to firms.
Evidence (Prasad et al., 2003 10) ）exists to support the hypothesis that financial markets develop best in the presence of legal codes that provide protection to shareholdersʼ rights (in particular minority shareholdersʼ rights), definition of ownership (inside-ownership versus outsideownership) and regulation of the banking sector. Stein and Daude (2001 11) ） find that the quality of institutions has a positive effect on foreign direct investment flows.
A number of descriptive studies focus on Japanese investments in the EU -10. Yoshii (2002 12) ）highlights the importance of incentives that the Southeastern countries need to offer in order to compete with the Central economies in attracting FDI. Morita (2000a Morita ( , 2000b ）accentuates that the 14) ）highlights the benefits of joining the EU for the Czech Republic and consequences on FDI. Taguchi (2002 15) ）presents the approach of the Japanese government and guidance for transition and developing economies. Empirical studies reveal that there is robust evidence that Japanese aid promotes FDI from Japan, while having no impact on FDI from other countries (Kimura and Todo, 2007 16) ） .
અ．Theoretical Considerations
Before the collapse of communism net capital flows into the EU -10
were largely in the form of commercial bank loans and trade finance to state-owned foreign trade banks subject to sovereign guarantee 17) . The shift to market economy resulted in inflows of capital from developed economies, especially from the EU developed nations. 19) ） . His approach explains the existence, activities and strategies of multinational enterprises through the synthesis of macro and micro-economic determinants of FDI flows ; it integrates industrial economics and location theory within the broader framework of the theories of international trade and investment.
The OLI framework identifies three sources of advantage that are preconditions for firms to engage in international production, i. e., to become internationally accepted governance standards is that these standards will assist them to achieve their aims and to attract investment. The incentive for their adoption by states is that these standards will strengthen their economies and encourage business probity 21) ʼ.
Corporate governance contributes to increased transparency in the financial market especially through the fact that companies should be in a higher degree accountable to society and investors ; all EU-10 economies 
આ．Japanese FDI to the EU-10
At the start of transition in 1990 there were high expectations from the EU -10 countries to attract Japanese FDI. However, the reality did not ） . Besides the advantages the three countries offered, it is also obvious that they were the leaders of reforms in the region and were most successful in the transition to market economy.
Most of the FDI inflows in the EU-10 occurred during the privatisation process, but Japanese investments stand out due to the fact that they are Greenfield investments. Japanese companies had several reasons for not participating in the privatisation programs of the EU -10 ; mainly they centre on the idea that they did not trust the consultancy companies demanding high fees in return for information on the operations of the companies to be privatised. Japanese FDI in the EU-10 was managed through a general trade company, ʻsogoshosha 25) ʼ. By the time Japanese investments entered the EU-10 market, they had to take into account the existing corporate governance structures and business environment, and it
was not a question of influencing the corporate governance but rather of choosing the countries with better practices.
The main reason for Japanese investments was to move (or establish) production bases to locations where costs are lower, but there were also key factors that attracted Japanese investments in the EU-10 countries.
Some of the features that attracted Japanese investments in the EU-10 :
a tradition of manufacturing -all countries had stable and old history in manufacturing ; good quality of labour force, especially skilled production managers ; low wages compared to developed Western The history of Japanese direct investments in Western Europe points to the fact that the first investments were in the sales sector, followed by manufacturing sector and R & D 26) . However, in the EU -10 countries,
Japanese investments started in the manufacturing sector (mainly through the transportation and machinery parts industry followed by electric and electronic parts industry), followed by the non-manufacturing sector, as observed in Table 4 27) ，Japanese direct investment in the EU is expected to maintain momentum in spite of the financial crisis.
In order to remain an attractive destination for investors and even more in the case of Japanese investors, the EU-10 must strive to improve their business environment and achieve a goodand efficient macro corporate governance. An investment climate that leads to significant FDI inflows goes beyond macro-economic stability and the non-discriminatory treatment of foreign investors ; FDI requires an ability to exercise corporate governance without arbitrary bureaucratic interference and a transparent and fair regulatory and legal environment.
ઇ．Hypothesis and model development
The hypothesis of this study states that Japanese FDI inflow in the EU -10 countries is influenced by the quality of macro corporate governance.
In other words, if the EU-10 countries achieve a good quality of macro corporate governance they can attract more Japanese investors and higher FDI inflows. Where i is the country subscript, t is the time (year) subscript, β are the unknown parameters to be estimated, and ε is the usual random disturbance term. Only the Japanese direct investments and GDP per capita are used in logarithm form. The main interest of this empirical study is the sign and the magnitude of β 1 (that is, the marginal effect of corporate governance on the Japanese direct investment inflows), while the effects of the control variables are of a secondary interest.
ઈ．Results
We construct four variation of the suggested model. As we can observe in Table 6 .1, Model ⑴ contains all the variables presented above and we do not employ dummy variables ; Model ⑵ eliminates the Industry variable in order to observe the significance of the model without the attraction for the manufacturing tradition of the EU-10 economies and we controls for the regional aspects -the region dummy controls for the regional choice of Japanese investments within the EU-10 economies. In Model ⑶ the variable Wage is eliminated in order to observe the significance of the model without the low wage attraction factor ; the region dummy controls the regional preference. Model ⑷ is the complete model suggested, with the two dummy variables, the control for reform and region.
In the analysis of all four models we can observe that the proxy for market size (GDP per capita) has a positive significance given by the t- . Although the values for the TROP variable are not impressive, nonetheless, in all four models we observe a positive association between Japanese investment and the share of trade in GDP at the 0.00 significance levels in all four models.
The EU-10 economies before 1990 functioned with employment on the job ; reform brought along high levels of unemployment, inexperiencedpreviously. The negative association between Japanese investments and the unemployment rate in all models supports the idea that investments concentrate on markets capable of high consumption and confirms the traditional approaches that higher FDI inflows reduce unemployment.
High inflation along with unemployment are common phenomena during economic reforms ; high inflation promotes FDI and there should be a positive association between high inflation and FDI ; however, very high inflation rates can be considered an impediment to FDI since it implies macroeconomic instability. In models ⑴, ⑵ and ⑷ inflation contributes to attracting Japanese inflows, but except for model ⑴ its significance is relative. In model ⑶ the association between Japanese investments and inflation is negative with a t-value of −0.34.
All three models which employ the gross average monthly earnings variable reveal a negative significance enforcing the attraction for Japanese investments due to low labour costs in the EU-10 economies ; along with location factors the low wages are the top attraction features. Due to its profound effects on production costs, investment depends on wage levels. The relocation of the large Japanese manufacturing lines (Matsushita and Suzuki) as mentioned previously occurred due to the skilled workforce and low wages especially in the automobile industry.
The strong positive association between the industry share in GDP and Japanese investments reflected in the three t-values (7.5728, 5.9034 and 5.6541) all with p-value significance 0.00, confirm the importance of the industry sector and good quality of labour force skills. . The same situation applies to Japanese investments ; the top three recipients of Japanese direct investments are rated best regarding corporate governance aspects.
The regression results show that there is variability between 53 and 71 percent in corporate governance captured by the variability of Japanese direct investments in all four models suggested. 30) The large-scale privatisation index has a rating system between 1 (little progress) and 4＋（standards and performance typical of advanced industrial economies ; more than 75 percent of enterprise assets in private ownership with effective corporate governance).
31) The small-scale privatisation index has a rating system between 1 (little progress) and 4 ＋（standards and performance typical of advanced industrial economies ; no state ownership of small enterprises ; effective tradability of land).
32) The index of banking sector reform has a rating system between 1 (little progress beyond the establishment of a two-tier system) and 4＋（standards and performance 
